

# SMART CONTRACT CODE REVIEW AND SECURITY ANALYSIS REPORT



Customer: YellowNetwork\_Layer-3 Foundation
Date: 2 March, 2023



This report may contain confidential information about IT systems and the intellectual property of the Customer, as well as information about potential vulnerabilities and methods of their exploitation.

The report can be disclosed publicly after prior consent by another Party. Any subsequent publication of this report shall be without mandatory consent.

# Document

| Name        | Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for<br>YellowNetwork Layer-3 Foundation |  |  |  |
|-------------|---|--|--|--|
| Approved By | Yevheniy Bezuhlyi   SC Audits Head at Hacken OU   |  |  |  |
| Туре        | ERC20 token   |  |  |  |
| Platform    | EVM   |  |  |  |
| Language    | Solidity  |  |  |  |
| Methodology | Link  |  |  |  |
| Changelog   | 22.02.2023 – Initial Review<br>02.03.2023 – Second Review                                       |  |  |  |



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# Introduction

Hacken OÜ (Consultant) was contracted by YellowNetwork Layer-3 Foundation (Customer) to conduct a Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis. This report presents the findings of the security assessment of the Customer's smart contracts.

# Scope

The scope of the project is smart contracts in the repository:

| Repository                 | https://github.com/layer-3/clearsync  |
|----------------------------|---|
| Commit                     | 9ab5313ac5b3b7ed9ba402de86340394b88c7bd1  |
| Whitepaper                 | Not provided  |
| Functional<br>Requirements | Link  |
| Technical<br>Requirements  | Link  |
| Contracts                  | <pre>File: ./contracts/Token.sol SHA3:dd87ed35778bd10e5b55f5ccf37ff1a37ceaf0551a1ad78268c15e187acca440 File: .contracts/interfaces/IBlacklist.sol SHA3 73757b8881c1d29a703eaeec30e81f23bbb386b42a6f5595a9c16a8556e748f1</pre> |

# Initial review scope

# Second review scope

| Repository                 | https://github.com/layer-3/clearsync  |
|----------------------------|---|
| Commit                     | 5b86a2134d295ac11af97d4f239782222e95fe24  |
| Whitepaper                 | Link  |
| Functional<br>Requirements | Link  |
| Technical<br>Requirements  | Link  |
| Contracts                  | <pre>File: ./contracts/Token.sol SHA3:9b995473862b428b32a5cab75e4c8aae2903c1c8b9cc6ef29fc4bd35057c2d5f File: .contracts/interfaces/IBlacklist.sol SHA3:76a94f93ff4eddecd5cf6ac732a573ab3435729fc43a48eee87cff2806b11621</pre> |



# Severity Definitions

| Risk Level | Description  |
|------------|--|
| Critical   | Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to<br>exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract<br>state manipulation by external or internal actors.  |
| High       | High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit,<br>requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited<br>scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or<br>contract state manipulation by external or internal<br>actors. |
| Medium     | Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state<br>manipulations but cannot lead to asset loss. Major<br>deviations from best practices are also in this category.   |
| Low        | Low vulnerabilities are related to outdated and unused<br>code or minor Gas optimization. These issues won't have a<br>significant impact on code execution but affect code<br>quality   |



# Executive Summary

The score measurement details can be found in the corresponding section of the <u>scoring methodology</u>.

## Documentation quality

The total Documentation Quality score is 10 out of 10.

- Business logic is provided.
- Use cases are provided.
- Whitepaper is provided.
- Functional requirements are provided.

#### Code quality

The total Code Quality score is 10 out of 10.

- NatSpec is present.
- Code follows Solidity style guidelines.

#### Test coverage

Code coverage of the project is 95.83% (branch coverage).

#### Security score

As a result of the audit, the code contains **1** low severity issue. The security score is **10** out of **10**.

All found issues are displayed in the "Findings" section.

#### Summary

According to the assessment, the Customer's smart contract has the following score: **10**.



The final score

| Review date | Low | Medium | High | Critical |
|-------------|-----|--------|------|----------|
| 22 Feb 2023 | 0   | 0      | 1    | 0        |
| 2 Mar 2023  | 1   | 0      | 0    | 0        |

| Table. | The | distribution | of | issues | during | the | audit |
|--------|-----|--------------|----|--------|--------|-----|-------|
|--------|-----|--------------|----|--------|--------|-----|-------|



# System Overview

YellowNetwork is a simple system with the following contracts:

- Token simple ERC-20 token that allows mint, transfer and burn tokens with addition of blacklist. Addresses on blacklist cannot transfer tokens. While deploying contract developer needs to provide following attributes:
  - Name: token name
  - Symbol: token symbol
  - Supply Cap: minting over cap is not allowed.

Contract uses roles to restrict access to important functions.

• IBlacklist – an interface that contains functions and events for blacklisting mechanisms.

# Privileged roles

- DEFAULT\_ADMIN\_ROLE address with that role can activate minting tokens.
- COMPLIANCE\_ROLE address with that role can add and remove given address from blacklist. Additionally, that role allows to burn all tokens from blacklisted addresses.
- MINTER\_ROLE address with that role can mint new tokens.

## Risks

- An account with the COMPLIANCE\_ROLE can blacklist and then an account with DEFAULT\_ADMIN\_ROLE can burn tokens of any account without allowance. Tokens can be burned from contracts such as LPs.
- The repository contains contracts that are out of the audit scope. Secureness and reliability of those contracts may not be guaranteed by the current audit.



# Checked Items

We have audited the Customers' smart contracts for commonly known and specific vulnerabilities. Here are some items considered:

| Item                                   | Туре                      | Description   | Status       |
|--|---------------------------|---|--------------|
| Default<br>Visibility                  | <u>SWC-100</u><br>SWC-108 | Functions and state variables visibility<br>should be set explicitly. Visibility<br>levels should be specified consciously.                             | Passed       |
| Integer<br>Overflow and<br>Underflow   | <u>SWC-101</u>            | If unchecked math is used, all math operations should be safe from overflows and underflows.  | Passed       |
| Outdated<br>Compiler<br>Version        | <u>SWC-102</u>            | It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity compiler.   | Passed       |
| Floating<br>Pragma                     | <u>SWC-103</u>            | Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested thoroughly.  | Passed       |
| Unchecked Call<br>Return Value         | <u>SWC-104</u>            | The return value of a message call should be checked.   | Not Relevant |
| Access Control<br>&<br>Authorization   | <u>CWE-284</u>            | Ownership takeover should not be<br>possible. All crucial functions should<br>be protected. Users could not affect<br>data that belongs to other users. | Passed       |
| SELFDESTRUCT<br>Instruction            | <u>SWC-106</u>            | The contract should not be self-destructible while it has funds belonging to users.   | Not Relevant |
| Check-Effect-<br>Interaction           | <u>SWC-107</u>            | Check-Effect-Interaction pattern should<br>be followed if the code performs ANY<br>external call.   | Passed       |
| Assert<br>Violation                    | <u>SWC-110</u>            | Properly functioning code should never reach a failing assert statement.  | Passed       |
| Deprecated<br>Solidity<br>Functions    | <u>SWC-111</u>            | Deprecated built-in functions should never be used.   | Passed       |
| Delegatecall<br>to Untrusted<br>Callee | <u>SWC-112</u>            | Delegatecalls should only be allowed to trusted addresses.  | Not Relevant |
| DoS (Denial of<br>Service)             | <u>SWC-113</u><br>SWC-128 | Execution of the code should never be blocked by a specific contract state unless required.   | Passed       |



| Race<br>Conditions                     | <u>SWC-114</u>   | Race Conditions and Transactions Order<br>Dependency should not be possible.  | Passed       |  |
|--|--|---|--------------|--|
| Authorization<br>through<br>tx.origin  | <u>SWC-115</u>   | tx.origin should not be used for authorization.   | Not Relevant |  |
| Block values<br>as a proxy for<br>time | <u>SWC-116</u>   | Block numbers should not be used for time calculations.   | Passed       |  |
| Signature<br>Unique Id                 | <u>SWC-117</u><br><u>SWC-121</u><br><u>SWC-122</u><br><u>EIP-155</u><br><u>EIP-712</u> | Signed messages should always have a<br>unique id. A transaction hash should not<br>be used as a unique id. Chain<br>identifiers should always be used. All<br>parameters from the signature should be<br>used in signer recovery. EIP-712 should<br>be followed during a signer<br>verification. | Not Relevant |  |
| Shadowing<br>State Variable            | <u>SWC-119</u>   | State variables should not be shadowed.   | Passed       |  |
| Weak Sources<br>of Randomness          | <u>SWC-120</u>   | Random values should never be generated from Chain Attributes or be predictable.  | Not Relevant |  |
| Incorrect<br>Inheritance<br>Order      | <u>SWC-125</u>   | When inheriting multiple contracts,<br>especially if they have identical<br>functions, a developer should carefully<br>specify inheritance in the correct<br>order.   | Passed       |  |
| Calls Only to<br>Trusted<br>Addresses  | <u>EEA-Lev</u><br><u>el-2</u><br><u>SWC-126</u>  | All external calls should be performed only to trusted addresses.   | Not Relevant |  |
| Presence of<br>Unused<br>Variables     | <u>SWC-131</u>   | The code should not contain unused variables if this is not <u>justified</u> by design.   | Passed       |  |
| EIP Standards<br>Violation             | EIP  | EIP standards should not be violated.   | Not Relevant |  |
| Assets<br>Integrity                    | Custom   | Funds are protected and cannot be<br>withdrawn without proper permissions or<br>be locked on the contract.  | Passed       |  |
| User Balances<br>Manipulation          | Custom   | Contract owners or any other third party<br>should not be able to access funds<br>belonging to users.   | Passed       |  |
| Data<br>Consistency                    | Custom   | Smart contract data should be consistent all over the data flow.  | Passed       |  |



| Flashloan<br>Attack          | Custom | When working with exchange rates, they<br>should be received from a trusted source<br>and not be vulnerable to short-term rate<br>changes that can be achieved by using<br>flash loans. Oracles should be used. | Not Relevant |
|------------------------------|--------|---|--------------|
| Token Supply<br>Manipulation | Custom | Tokens can be minted only according to<br>rules specified in a whitepaper or any<br>other documentation provided by the<br>Customer.  |              |
| Gas Limit and<br>Loops       | Custom | Transaction execution costs should not<br>depend dramatically on the amount of<br>data stored on the contract. There<br>should not be any cases when execution<br>fails due to the block Gas limit.             | Not Relevant |
| Style Guide<br>Violation     | Custom | Style guides and best practices should be followed.   | Passed       |
| Requirements<br>Compliance   | Custom | The code should be compliant with the requirements provided by the Customer.  | Passed       |
| Environment<br>Consistency   | Custom | The project should contain a configured<br>development environment with a<br>comprehensive description of how to<br>compile, build and deploy the code.   | Passed       |
| Secure Oracles<br>Usage      | Custom | The code should have the ability to<br>pause specific data feeds that it relies<br>on. This should be done to protect a<br>contract from compromised oracles.   | Not Relevant |
| Tests Coverage               | Custom | The code should be covered with unit<br>tests. Test coverage should be<br>sufficient, with both negative and<br>positive cases covered. Usage of<br>contracts by multiple users should be<br>tested.            | Passed       |
| Stable Imports               | Custom | The code should not reference draft<br>contracts, which may be changed in the<br>future.  | Passed       |



# Findings

## Example Critical

No critical severity issues were found.

#### High

#### H01. Highly Permissive Role Access

An account with the COMPLIANCE\_ROLE can blacklist and then burn tokens of any account without allowance. Tokens can be burned from contracts such as LPs, which can lead to market manipulation.

Path: ./contracts/Token.sol: burnBlacklisted()

Recommendation: Do not burn tokens without allowance.

**Status:** Mitigated (The functionality is needed to protect the protocol. COMPLIANCE\_ROLE can blacklist accounts. DEFAULT\_ADMIN\_ROLE can burn blacklisted funds. Both roles should be granted only to multisigs with  $\frac{1}{2}$  signatures required.)

#### Medium

No medium severity issues were found.

#### Low

#### L01. Redundant View Functions

The variable *TOKEN\_SUPPLY\_CAP* is marked public. View function for the public variable is generated automatically by the compiler.

Path: ./contracts/Token.sol: cap()

**Recommendation**: Delete *cap()* function or mark *OKEN\_SUPPLY\_CAP* variable as private.

Status: New



# Disclaimers

#### Hacken Disclaimer

The smart contracts given for audit have been analyzed based on best industry practices at the time of the writing of this report, with cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment, and functionality (performing the intended functions).

The report contains no statements or warranties on the identification of all vulnerabilities and security of the code. The report covers the code submitted and reviewed, so it may not be relevant after any modifications. Do not consider this report as a final and sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bug-free status, or any other contract statements.

While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only — we recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contracts.

English is the original language of the report. The Consultant is not responsible for the correctness of the translated versions.

## Technical Disclaimer

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on a blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks. Thus, the Consultant cannot guarantee the explicit security of the audited smart contracts.